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Abstract. In this article, I argue that Wang Yangming’s Neo-Confucian religious beliefs can
be warranted, and that the rationality of his religious beliefs constitutes a significant defeater
for the rationality of Christian belief on Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant. I also ques-
tion whether the notion of warrant as proper function can adequately account for theories of
religious knowledge in which the affections play an integral role. I demonstrate how a consid-
eration of Wang’s epistemology reveals a difficulty for Plantinga’s defense of the rationality
of Christian belief and highlights a limitation of Plantinga’s current conception of warrant as
proper function.
The teachings of the Chinese scholar-official Wang Yangming (1472–
1529) form the basis of what has become known as “The Learning of the
Mind” (xin xue ), one of the two leading schools of thought in the history
of Neo-Confucianism.1 Wang’s philosophy has greatly influenced the devel-
opment of Confucian thought in both Japan and Korea, and has inspired many
important modern Chinese thinkers, such as Xiong Shili ( 1885–1968)
and Tang Junyi ( 1909–1978). This article offers an analysis of Wang’s
central concept, the cognitive and affective faculty Wang calls the liangzhi2
. It explores whether the liangzhi can serve as a source of warrant for
the beliefs produced by the liangzhi and examines some of the implications
that follow from this. Alvin Plantinga, one of the most prominent epistemolo-
gists in recent decades, has described warrant as the feature that distinguishes
mere true belief from knowledge. Plantinga has proposed a version of warrant
based on a theory of proper functionalism and has used his account of warrant
to explain how Christian belief can be warranted. In this article, I argue that
some Neo-Confucian religious beliefs, which are antithetical to Christianity,
can also be warranted, and that the rationality of Neo-Confucian religious
belief constitutes a significant defeater for the rationality of Christian belief
on Plantinga’s theory. I also question whether the notion of warrant as proper
function can adequately account for certain theories of moral and religious
knowledge, theories in which proper affective states play an integral role. I
demonstrate how a consideration of Wang’s epistemology reveals a difficulty
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for Plantinga’s defense of the rationality of Christian belief and highlights a
limitation of Plantinga’s current conception of warrant as proper function.
The argument of this paper proceeds in three stages. First, I describe
briefly what Wang thinks the liangzhi is and how it functions. In the second
stage, I turn to the question of warrant and consider the theory of warrant
as proper function. I examine whether the liangzhi can meet this criterion
of warrant and conclude that it can indeed meet this criterion. The section
concludes with a consideration of the problem of religious pluralism for the
rationality of Christian belief. The third stage reassesses the conception of
warrant as proper function in light of Wang’s theory of liangzhi and his
teaching of the unity of knowledge and action.
This article is intended to be of use and of interest to at least three groups
that do not communicate with each other as often as one would like to see.
First, I hope that the discussion of the implications of religious pluralism
for the rationality of Christian belief and the analysis of the centrality of
the affections in religious epistemology will be helpful to those philos-
ophers concerned with similar issues in the Western traditions. Second, this
article aims to interest Confucianists, those professionally concerned with
the history of the Confucian tradition, as well as Sinologists in general by
demonstrating how Neo-Confucian religious belief can be warranted and
by underscoring and further clarifying the integral role of the affections
in Wang’s epistemology and moral psychology. Finally, I intend the article
as a whole to be of interest to the steadily increasing group of Western
philosophers who are interested in Chinese philosophy in its own right.
What is the Liangzhi and how does it function?
The liangzhi is the innate fully formed cognitive and affective faculty
that enables one to know the li (commonly translated as “principle”) of the
mind and universe. For most Neo-Confucians, li describes the way a thing or
state of affairs ought to be.3 So when things or states of affairs are in accord
with li, they are deemed “natural,” and when they are not, they are deemed
“deviant.” All things possess all the li of the universe within them. In human
beings, the li exist complete in the mind (xin ). For Wang, though, the mind
not only contains li, the mind is itself li: “Knowing (zhi ) is the conscious
aspect (ling chu ) of li. If one speaks of it as master [of the body], one
calls it mind. If one speaks of it as one’s endowment, one calls it nature (xing
).”4 This equating of li with the mind sets Wang’s view of the mind apart
from the Cheng-Zhu interpretation.5
From birth, all human beings possess this complete and perfect mind, what
Wang calls the mind in its original state (xinzhibenti ) or the original
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mind (benxin ). Wang expands on Mengzi’s idea of the four dispositions
(literally, “four minds” si xin ) that develop from the four sprouts,6 “Pure
knowing is what Mengzi spoke of when he said, ‘The mind of right and wrong
is something all men possess.’ The mind of right and wrong does not need to
think to know and does not need to study before it can perform. This is why it
is called pure knowing (liangzhi)!”7 The liangzhi operates as a faculty of
the mind that discerns flawlessly, naturally, and spontaneously between right
and wrong. It not only forms correct beliefs, it also produces correct affective
responses.8
If our liangzhi is a perfect moral guide, how does Wang account for the bad
moral choices we human beings seem to make regularly? In line with the rest
of the Neo-Confucian tradition, Wang explains moral wrong by appealing
to the concept of qi (variously translated as “material force” or “lively
matter”).9 All things in the universe are a combination of li and qi. Qi is
the stuff of which the universe is made. It exists in various grades of purity.
Although all things possess all the li of the universe within them, because of
the impurity of the qi of which they are composed, some li are obstructed,
thereby accounting for the differences between things.10 Against the Neo-
Confucians who Wang claims have distorted Zhu Xi’s original position, Wang
maintains that li do not exist only in external things, but also exist in the
human mind. In a key passage, Wang first quotes Zhu and then maintains
that Zhu was correct about the “universal dispersion and unity [of li],” but
that later generations have distorted Zhu’s view and consider the mind to
be separate from li. Wang thought that this idea could mislead people into
believing the dangerous notion that li do not already exist in the mind, a
notion antithetical to Wang’s philosophy.11
For Wang, human beings are unique in that we are able to purify our qi
endowments, thus allowing all the li within us, or more accurately, within our
minds to shine forth. The impure grades of qi in human beings are manifested
primarily as self-centered desires (si yu ), which Wang also refers to
as the “self-centered mind” (si xin ), “self-centered ideas” (si yi ),
and “self-centered thoughts” (si nian ).12 He believes that because of the
great obfuscatory power of our self-centered desires, we have lost touch with
our original minds and with our liangzhi faculties. For the liangzhi of our
minds to operate at its optimum effectiveness, we first need to eliminate our
self-centered desires. Wang employs Buddhist-inspired similes to illustrate
the relation between the liangzhi and self-centered desires. Just as the sun
shining behind clouds or a clear mirror hidden beneath dust, the liangzhi
must be unobstructed by the “clouds” and “dust” of self-centered desires for
it to apprehend li and lead us to correct moral decisions and affections.13 I
will assume in this article that Wang’s Neo-Confucian beliefs as I have thus
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far described them will appear to the reader as being obviously contrary to
orthodox reformed Christian beliefs, at least as Plantinga seems to understand
them.
Warrant and religious belief
Warranted belief
The theory of warrant as proper function has been most thoroughly developed
by Alvin Plantinga in his trilogy on the notion of warrant.14 I have chosen
to concentrate on Plantinga’s theory of warrant not only because it is one
of the most influential and well-developed accounts of warrant, but also
because, in contrast to many other epistemologists, Plantinga has explicitly
applied his theory to religious beliefs. Plantinga’s basic definition of warrant
is that quality or quantity enough of which distinguishes mere true belief
from knowledge. His theory of what warrant requires is motivated in part by
the perceived weaknesses in earlier internalist and externalist views of what
makes true belief knowledge.15 These he canvasses in his first book, entitled,
Warrant: The Current Debate. The second book of his trilogy, Warrant and
Proper Function, develops his own notion of warrant in considerable detail.
Briefly put, his theory of warrant argues that a belief p will have warrant
for a person S if and only if p is produced in S by cognitive faculties func-
tioning properly in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of
cognitive faculties, according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth, and
the degree of warrant p enjoys for S is directly proportional to the firmness
with which S holds p. Moreover, a design plan that is successfully aimed
at truth is one for which there is a high objective probability that a belief
produced according to that plan will be true. This formula is meant to be
the core of the concept of warrant. There is a penumbral area beyond the
core where there is vagueness and imprecision in applying the formula, and
Plantinga concedes that the application is so context sensitive that sometimes
there is really no answer to the question whether a given case is a case of
warrant.16
In the final book of his trilogy, Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga
applies this notion of warrant to Christian belief, and he argues that Christian
belief can be warranted. Plantinga uses a model to demonstrate this. For
Plantinga, to give a model of a proposition or state of affairs X is to show
how it could be that X is true or actual. The model is supposed to show that X
is possible, and that if the model is true, so is X. For his own models, which
he calls the simple and extended versions of the Aquinas/Calvin model (A/C
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model), Plantinga claims that they are epistemically possible, that there are no
de jure challenges to the models that are independent of the de facto question,
that the models are true (although he will not try to show that they are true),
and that they are just two out of a whole range of possible models. Plantinga
wants to be clear that he intends to counter de jure, not de facto objections. De
facto objections speak against the truth of Christian belief, whereas de jure
objections are to the effect that “Christian belief, whether or not true, is at any
rate unjustified, or irrational, or not intellectually respectable, or contrary to
sound morality, or without sufficient evidence, or in some other way rationally
unacceptable, not up to snuff from an intellectual point of view.”17 As noted
earlier, one of his aims is to show that all de jure objections are dependent on
de facto objections.
Plantinga derives the A/C model from the Thomist and Calvinist teaching
that all people are born with a capacity for knowledge of God that can be
developed as people mature spiritually. Calvin calls this capacity the sensus
divinitatis. Plantinga interprets the sensus divinitatis (SD) as “a disposition
(or set of dispositions) to form theistic beliefs in various circumstances, in
response to the sorts of conditions or stimuli that trigger the working of this
sense of divinity.”18 The SD resembles perception, memory, and a priori belief
in the sense that beliefs produced by the SD are occasioned by the circum-
stances and are not conclusions from them. They are properly basic beliefs
with respect to warrant. The beliefs can have warrant even if the believer
has no argument at all.19 They can have warrant because the SD is a belief-
producing faculty that under the right circumstances produces belief that is
not evidentially based on other beliefs. Moreover, on Plantinga’s model, the
SD is designed and created by God. The purpose of the SD is to enable people
to form true beliefs about God. Furthermore, Plantinga claims that when it
functions properly, it ordinarily does produce true beliefs about God. On the
A/C model, therefore, these beliefs meet the conditions for warrant, and if
they are held strongly enough, they can have enough warrant for knowledge.
Warranted Neo-Confucian belief
According to the theory of warrant laid out by Plantinga, Wang Yangming’s
Neo-Confucian beliefs could be warranted.20 Wang could propose a model for
Neo-Confucian belief based on his concept of liangzhi. Such a model could
meet the requirements for warrant as proper function. First, the liangzhi, once
it is discovered and utilized, is a properly functioning cognitive (and affective)
faculty. Second, the world of li and qi is an appropriate cognitive environment
for the operation of liangzhi. Third, the liangzhi faculty of our original minds
is simply the conscious aspect of li, which is itself descriptive and normative
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truth; li conveys the truth about the way things are when they are the way
they should be. It would thus be reasonable to conclude that the conscious
aspect of truth itself would operate in a truth-conducive and truth-preserving
manner. Finally, much hangs on the answer to the de facto question of whether
the Neo-Confucian view of ultimate reality, in which reality is composed
of qi and our minds are identified with li, is true. For if it were false, it is
probably not generated by cognitive faculties successfully aimed at truth.
So if it were false, beliefs produced by the liangzhi would probably not be
warranted. If Wang’s view of ultimate reality were true, however, then the
liangzhi probably is successfully aiming at truth, and the beliefs produced
by the liangzhi probably are warranted.21 So the epistemic probability of
Wang’s Neo-Confucian beliefs being warranted, given the truth of Wang’s
view of ultimate reality and absent any significant defeaters, is high.22 Thus,
the liangzhi can serve as a source of warrant for Neo-Confucian beliefs, and
Neo-Confucian beliefs can be warranted.
What does this imply for Plantinga’s position? Plantinga treats the
problem of the rationality of other religions in the second half of the thirteenth
chapter of his Warranted Christian Belief. He sees the problem of religious
pluralism solely as a difficulty for the “exclusivist”: someone who does
not know of a demonstration or conclusive argument for the belief with
respect to which he is an exclusivist, or does not know of an argument that
would convince all or most intelligent and honest people of the truth of that
proposition.23
The version of the problem that Plantinga thinks is most cogent is
the charge of arbitrariness, which is the claim that the exclusivist treats
similar things differently.24 This charge of epistemic arbitrariness constitutes
a defeater for Christian belief because once the Christian believer comes to
see this, he has a reason for giving up his belief, or at least, for holding it with
less firmness.25 Plantinga thinks that he can show that religious pluralism
does not constitute a defeater for Christian belief. But I argue that it can be a
defeater for Christian belief and for the validity of the A/C model.
Plantinga maintains that the charge of epistemic arbitrariness is effective
only if the beliefs of the competing religions are epistemically similar.
A person would not be epistemically arbitrary in believing the claims of
Christianity rather than the claims of any other religions if that person thought
that Christianity was epistemically superior to the others. Plantinga declares
that this is the case for the Christian. The Christian thinks that Christianity is
true and that whatever is incompatible with it is false. So for the Christian,
the major religions are not relevantly similar, and the Christian is not treating
similar cases differently. Plantinga admits that the Christian and those who
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disagree with her could be internally on an epistemic par: they are equally
convinced of the truth of their belief, and the internally available markers are
relevantly similar, such as having evidence from other beliefs they hold or
having similar phenomenology.26
Nevertheless, Plantinga maintains that there is an important epistemic
difference between the Christian and the non-Christian because if Plantinga’s
extended A/C model is correct, the Christian and the non-Christian are in
different epistemic situations, and the Christian can claim a special source
of knowledge. Plantinga asserts that for the objector’s charge of arbitrariness
to stick, the objector would have to assume, “unjustifiably and without argu-
ment, that neither that model nor any other according to which there is a
source of warranted Christian belief is in fact correct and that there is no such
source for Christian belief. That assumption has nothing to be said for it; the
arbitrariness charge therefore disintegrates.”27
But is the adherent of a religion or worldview that is largely incompatible
with Christianity, such as Neo-Confucianism, really arbitrarily assuming
that Christianity is false? Letting “Neo-Confucianism” stand for Wang
Yangming’s version of Neo-Confucianism and letting “Neo-Confucian” stand
for an adherent of Wang’s version of Neo-Confucianism, one could say that
a Neo-Confucian could believe that his claims about ultimate reality are true,
and that whatever contradicts them is false.28 Similarly, the Christian believes
that the claims of Christianity derived from the sensus divinitatis are true and
believes that whatever contradicts them is false. If this were so, then if the
Neo-Confucian could rightly be accused of arbitrarily assuming the falsity
of Christianity, then the Christian could rightly be accused of arbitrarily
assuming the falsity of Neo-Confucianism. Plantinga’s charge would then be
self-defeating.
Perhaps what Plantinga really means is that the non-Christian objector
is not arbitrarily assuming the falsity of Christian belief, but the falsity of
the source of Christian belief, which on Plantinga’s theory is the sensus
divinitatis.29 Even if this were so, is the Neo-Confucian objector still guilty
of making an arbitrary assumption? This seems dubious. As I have demon-
strated above, the Neo-Confucian could show how Neo-Confucian belief is
probably warranted if Neo-Confucian belief is true. The Neo-Confucian and
the Christian would thus be on an epistemic par, and the Neo-Confucian
would not be arbitrarily assuming that the A/C model or something like it is
wrong. So if Plantinga can justifiably accuse the Neo-Confucian of making an
arbitrary assumption, then the Neo-Confucian can justifiably accuse
Plantinga of making an arbitrary assumption. Both parties can show how their
beliefs can be warranted if their religious systems are true, but in the scenario
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that Plantinga has laid out, neither party can conclusively demonstrate the
superiority of its position. So on the situation of religious pluralism, the
Christian would be treating similar things differently if he were to continue
to maintain the epistemic superiority of Christianity over Neo-Confucianism.
Plantinga has given no other reasons in his Warranted Christian Belief
for supposing that the proponents of other religious views are incorrect in
claiming that their beliefs are at least on an epistemic par with Christian
beliefs. He simply states that if the Christian has the warranted belief that
there is a significant difference between the epistemic situation of Christians
and non-Christians, then the Christian can reasonably claim that Christian
beliefs are epistemically superior to those of other religions.30 But I have
argued that the Christian cannot reasonably claim this when he knows it
is reasonable for the adherents of many other religions to claim the same
for their own religions.31 For Plantinga to escape the charge of epistemic
arbitrariness, he must admit that non-Christian belief can be on an epistemic
par with Christian belief. But this concession considerably weakens his
argument for the rationality of Christian belief.
Therefore, the problem of epistemic egoism that results from awareness of
the rationality of non-Christian religions can constitute a significant defeater
for Christian belief. And if it is a defeater for Christian belief, it is a fortiori
a defeater for the A/C model, which depends on the truth of Christian belief.
This is true of the beliefs of any religion that employs a similar epistemic
model, including Neo-Confucianism. Wang Yangming could thus be equally
vulnerable to this charge. He has not, however, argued for the epistemic
superiority of Neo-Confucian belief in this way. Rather, I have rationally
reconstructed his response to Plantinga’s position. I have shown how Wang
could demonstrate that Neo-Confucian belief is warranted. Wang’s own style
of argument was much more therapeutic, challenging his listeners to first try
out his way of seeing and living in the world.32
Plantinga might argue that even if the Christian were somehow mistaken
in thinking that she has a warranted and special source of knowledge, she
“needn’t be culpable in holding this belief.”33 But if the Christian knows that
other religions that contradict Christianity, such as Neo-Confucianism, can
demonstrate how their beliefs can be warranted, yet she lacks a conclusive
demonstration or argument for the truth of her beliefs, she has a partial
defeater for her Christian belief, and by implication, for the A/C model, and
hence, she is at least partially culpable in holding her Christian belief.
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Knowledge and affective states
Selflessness necessary for proper function
Although Neo-Confucian beliefs can be warranted in the contemporary sense
of warrant as proper function, Wang Yangming’s Neo-Confucian theory of
knowledge demands more from a notion of warrant. If warrant is defined as
the feature that distinguishes mere true belief from knowledge, then for Wang,
warrant would also require the believer to be in the proper affective state.
This is because Wang conceives of the liangzhi also as an affective faculty.
To function properly, that is, to function the way it is supposed to function,
the liangzhi must be free from the interference of self-centered desires. For
one’s liangzhi to be a properly functioning affective faculty, one must be in an
affective state of selflessness, an affective state in which one’s self-centered
desires have been eliminated.
In this article, I use the term “affection” to signify a broad category
covering what are commonly called feelings, emotions, moods, and attitudes.
A precise formulation of a universal definition of any of these terms lies well
beyond the scope of this paper. For the purposes of my thesis, however, I
only need to consider the particular affections Wang uses in his examples –
love and hate, attraction and repulsion, desire and detestation, self-centered
desires, as well as the feelings of pain, hunger, and cold. The term “state”
denotes the condition of a subject’s affections at a specific, isolated point in
time. I use this term to emphasize that the subject must be experiencing the
affection at the relevant point in time. It does not matter, for the purposes of
determining warrant, whether one has experienced the affection in the past or
will experience it in the future. For one to have real knowledge, one must be
feeling the emotion at the same time one is holding the belief. So “affective
state” means the affections that the subject is experiencing at the specific
moment when a potentially warranted belief is held.
By “selflessness,” I mean the absence of self-centered desires. I use “self-
centered” to translate Wang’s si , by which he does not mean what we
usually mean by “selfish” or “self-centered,” which is to privilege one’s own
good at the expense of the good of others. Rather, Wang’s si means to make
oneself the center of one’s world. In this sense of self-centered, one could
at the same time, be self-centered but not selfish. One could be performing
great acts of altruism, and placing the needs of others well above one’s own
needs, while at the same time, being unable to empathize with others in any
meaningful sense.34 Selflessness is simply the converse of self-centeredness.
When one is acting selflessly in this sense, one is not thinking about oneself
at all. One is completely unselfconscious and wholly unaware of any sense
of personal agency. Wang’s notion of self-centeredness arises from his belief
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in the underlying metaphysical unity of the universe, a belief he shares with
almost all Neo-Confucians.35
Thus, the affective state of selflessness is necessary for the proper function
of the affective faculty of liangzhi. The liangzhi, however, is also a cognitive
faculty. Since the liangzhi is a single faculty encompassing both affective
and cognitive aspects, it is understandable why Wang posits a very strong tie
between affection and cognition. Indeed, he believes proper cognitive func-
tion is contingent on the possession of proper affective states. A similar point
has been made in the philosophy of emotions; emotions play an important role
in guiding reasoning and framing salience, as well as potentially distorting
proper reasoning.36 For Wang, the liangzhi cannot operate freely and properly
when it is impeded by self-centered desires. Being in the affective state of
selflessness is thus necessary to turn one’s mere true belief into what Wang
calls “real knowledge” (zhenzhi ) or simply “knowledge” (zhi ), which
for Wang is the highest kind of knowledge attainable, and in the religious and
moral spheres, the only kind worth having.37
Accordingly, a necessary condition for having real knowledge is being in
a state of selflessness. How, though, does one eliminate one’s self-centered
desires and become selfless? Wang explains that the process begins with the
“rectification of thoughts” (gewu ):
Knowledge is the original substance of the mind. The mind is naturally
able to know . . . This is liangzhi and need not be sought outside [oneself].
If what emanates from liangzhi is not hindered by self-centered ideas,
the result will be like the saying, ‘If a man fully develops his feeling of
compassion, his benevolence will be more than he needs.’38 The ordinary
man, however, is not free from the obstruction of self-centered ideas. He
therefore requires the effort of the extension of knowledge (zhizhi )
and the rectification of thoughts (gewu) in order to overcome [his] self-
centered ideas and recover li (“principle”). Then the mind’s faculty of
liangzhi will no longer be obstructed but will be able to penetrate and
operate everywhere.39
The two terms that have been translated “extension of knowledge” and
the “rectification of thoughts” are drawn from the beginning of the Daxue
<< >> (usually translated as The Great Learning or The Learning of
Adults). The Daxue teaches that the extension of knowledge is contingent on
and comes after the rectification of thoughts. Wang interprets this to mean that
one must first “rectify” one’s thoughts in the sense of purging one’s thoughts
of the impurities of self-centeredness, and only then can one continue with
the task of the extension of knowledge, which results in the attainment of real
knowledge. Theoretically, these two tasks are carried out separately. Wang,
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however, prefers to emphasize their inseparability. I will expand on this in the
next section.
As for gewu, Wang has a unique interpretation of the term, which is
usually translated as “the investigation of things.” He explicitly rejects Zhu
Xi’s explanation that ge means “to reach” (zhi ) and wu means the affairs
or principles of things in the external realm.40 Wang believes that the word ge
means to “rectify,” and the word wu means the “things in the mind,” which
are simply one’s “thoughts.” Together, the phrase means “to rectify the things
in the mind” or, in other words, “to rectify thoughts”:
The word ge in gewu is the same as the ge in Mengzi’s expression, ‘A
great man rectified (ge) the ruler’s mind.’41 [Gewu] means to eliminate
whatever is incorrect in the mind and preserve the correctness of its
original substance. Wherever there is a thought, eliminate whatever is
incorrect and preserve the mind’s original substance. Then in all places,
at all times, the Heavenly li will definitely be preserved.42
Wang’s explanation of gewu is in line with his view that the mind is li
itself and that the proper place to discover li is in the mind itself, not in
the outside world.43 The more one eliminates incorrect thoughts, particularly
self-centered thoughts, the more one’s mind will be able to function freely
and to operate properly. The method of rectifying one’s thoughts, and thus
the key to eradicating inappropriate desires, is to monitor constantly one’s
thoughts. In carrying out this task, one is to be “like a cat catching mice –
with eyes intently watching and ears intently listening. As soon as a single
[self-centered] thought begins to stir, one must conquer it and cast it out . . .
Do not indulge or accommodate it in any way. Do not harbor it, and do not
allow it to escape.”44
Since few people can eliminate their self-centered desires all at once, the
task calls for continual effort. Every time one is successful at eradicating an
incorrect thought, one’s liangzhi will be able to operate more freely. The more
one’s liangzhi operates freely, the more easily one’s liangzhi can identify the
incorrect thoughts and eliminate them. When one eliminates the self-centered
desires relevant to a particular belief, and thus attains an affective state of
selflessness in relation to that belief, one’s liangzhi constitutes a properly
functioning cognitive-affective faculty relative to that belief.45 This is what
Wang has in mind when he gives the analogy of polishing the mirror, for
only when there is no dirt on the mirror’s surface can it function properly and
reflect the image before it.46
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The affective state resulting from action
Selflessness, however, only gets you part of the way to real knowledge. For
on Wang’s view, the cognitive-affective faculty of liangzhi could be func-
tioning properly in an appropriate cognitive-affective environment, while at
the same time producing beliefs with insufficient warrant for real knowledge.
This would be the case if one has not extended (zhi ) one’s liangzhi. For
Wang, the phrase zhizhi (“the extension of knowledge”) carries the more
specific meaning of zhi liangzhi (“extending one’s liangzhi”): “The extension
of knowledge is not – as later scholars say it is – ‘filling out and broadening’
one’s knowledge. It is simply to extend the liangzhi of my own mind.”47
Extending one’s liangzhi means to apply successfully one’s liangzhi to the
matters of one’s daily life.48 Since one cannot extend one’s liangzhi if self-
centered desires are obstructing it, the extension of liangzhi is contingent on
first being in an affective state of selflessness in relation to the specific belief
or item of knowledge. Only after the liangzhi is extended can one attain real
knowledge. Hence, being in an affective state of selflessness is necessary to
extend one’s liangzhi, which in turn is necessary for attaining an affective
state from action, which is the affective state resulting from fully extending
the liangzhi in one’s daily life. Further, this affective state from action is a
necessary condition for true belief to constitute real knowledge.
In an ideal world, one’s liangzhi would function properly and extend
effortlessly. In the actual world, however, even if one has removed the barrier
of self-centered desires and one’s liangzhi is functioning freely, one can still
be unable to extend fully one’s liangzhi. “The liangzhi naturally knows, which
is in fact quite easy. But often one cannot extend his liangzhi to the utmost.
This shows that it is not difficult to know but difficult to act.”49 Why is it so
difficult to extend one’s liangzhi?
In some cases, one’s self-centered desires still hinder the liangzhi. Wang
states that “it is because one is driven by the considerations of praise and
criticism or loss and gain [that one] cannot really extend one’s liangzhi.”50
This points to the interdependence of the rectification of thoughts and the
extension of knowledge that I alluded to earlier. Wang believes that by far the
most effective way of unearthing one’s incorrect thoughts is by attempting to
extend the liangzhi in one’s daily life. He strongly counsels against secluded
and solitary introspection.51 When the attempted extension fails, the subject
will then be in a much better position to identify the relevant self-centered
desires, and when they are identified, she will be forced to confront them.
Once she has eliminated them, she should then be able to extend her liangzhi
successfully. Also, it is possible that the subject be unaware of her relevant
uneliminated self-centered desires until she attempts to extend her liangzhi.
Once she makes the attempt, though, she will be in a position to monitor
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her mental responses to the situation. Then if she fails to extend her liangzhi
successfully, she would be in a position to ascertain her relevant self-centered
desires. She could then work on eradicating them, thereby rectifying her
thoughts. This is the cyclical process of the rectification of thoughts and the
extension of knowledge. Wang explains the link between the two:
The rectification of thoughts is the effort to extend knowledge. As one
knows how to extend his knowledge, he also knows how to rectify
thoughts. If he does not know how to rectify thoughts, it means he does
not yet know how to extend his knowledge.52
Nonetheless, this explanation seems to apply only to cases in which the
subject has failed to eliminate the relevant self-centered desires. The question
at hand, though, is whether, and if so why, one who has already eliminated
all relevant self-centered desires still cannot extend the liangzhi. The answer
lies in Wang’s central doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action (zhixing
heyi ). For Wang, the extension of liangzhi just is “acting” on the
deliverances of the properly functioning liangzhi:
We know that the extension of knowledge has to consist in action, and
it is clear that without action there can be no extension of knowledge.
Does not the state of the unity of knowledge and action stand sharply in
focus? . . . [W]henever the superior man is engaged in practical affairs or
discussion, he insists on the task of knowledge and action combined. The
aim is precisely to extend the liangzhi of his original mind. He is unlike
those who devote themselves to merely talking and hearing as though
that were knowledge, and divide knowledge and action into two separate
things as though they really could be itemized and take place one after the
other.53
Wang’s category of real knowledge applies only to knowledge combined with
action. Knowledge without action is a lower kind of knowledge. In most
cases, Wang simply refuses to give this lower level knowledge the honor of
the label “knowledge”: “There have never been people who know but do not
act. Those who are supposed to know but do not act simply do not know.”54
By “action,” Wang intends more than what we normally call actions.
Within the category of “action,” he includes the “acts” of thinking, feeling,
intending, and doing. Among the many examples Wang uses to illustrate
his concept of action, a favorite of his concerns the knowledge of the li
of filial piety. Wang asks rhetorically whether it is possible to know that
filial piety involves caring for the comfort of parents in both winter and
summer and serving and supporting them without actually caring for and
supporting and serving them.55 Wang admits that one can know the details
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or have right beliefs regarding filial piety, but unless one extends this lesser
kind of knowledge by actually caring for and serving one’s parents, one
will never achieve real knowledge of the notion of filial piety. In this sense,
“action” denotes what we usually mean by “action” – actually physically
doing something. Under this type of action as doing, Wang mentions that
certain things about archery and calligraphy can only be known by doing
them.56 In some cases, Wang could be seen as pointing to the distinction
between “knowing how” and “knowing that.”57 However, even if Wang’s
archery and calligraphy examples can be construed as involving practical
knowledge (“knowing how”), his other examples are clearly not concerned
with practical knowledge. In the case of filial piety, for instance, the issue
is not about whether the son knows the practical details about caring for his
parents, such as how to operate efficiently the family furnace to keep his
parents warm in the winter, but about whether the son applies what he does
know.
Wang also speaks explicitly, however, about how “action” involves the
emotions. Wang’s example of filial piety applies here as well, for the emotions
of love, concern, and respect for one’s parents are an essential part of Wang’s
notions of caring and serving one’s parents.58 Furthermore, Wang adduces the
examples of loving beautiful colors and detesting bad odors. Wang calls the
perception of the beautiful color and the smelling of the bad odor knowledge,
and the loving of the color and the detesting of the odor action. Also, he
considers the knowledge of pain, hunger, and cold as dependent on feeling
pain, hunger, and cold.59 The same holds for the bitterness of a bitter melon,
the knowledge of which depends on having personally tasted a bitter melon.60
Moreover, Wang discusses how desires are actions. Specifically, he cites the
desires for food and for travel.61 He contends that to know the taste of food
and to know a road, one first must desire to eat and desire to travel. These
desires are themselves actions. According to Wang, one has the desire to eat
and travel before one eats and travels. Also, only after one eats and travels
can one know that the food tastes good and the road is narrow. Wang even
considers thinking to be an action. He maintains that as soon as a thought is
aroused, it is an action.62 He also divides thinking into inquiring, learning,
pondering, and judging, and holds that these are all actions. Forming a belief
is itself an action.63
Hence, “action” for Wang is a broad spectrum encompassing thinking,
feeling, intending, and doing. It is not always clear in what sequence they
proceed. At least three different sequences are possible.
In the first, the belief follows from, and is directly consequent upon, the
doing and is sometimes an inference from it. This is the case with perceiving
the beautiful color and smelling the bad odor. The admiration and detestation
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immediately induces the belief that the color is indeed admirable and lovely
and that the odor is detestable and revolting. The feelings of pain, hunger, and
cold also fall under this sequence. The feelings induce the immediate beliefs
that pain, hunger, and cold are unpleasant. This first sequence of action can be
charted roughly as “doing (including experiencing and perceiving), feeling,
and thinking,” with “intending” occasionally coming before “doing.”
The second sequence applies to the desire to eat and travel. Wang believes
that the desire to eat and travel induces the intention to eat and travel,
which leads to actually eating and traveling, which eventually leads to the
right belief that the food tastes good and the road is narrow. This second
sequence is “feeling, intending, doing, and thinking.” In these first two kinds
of sequences, the doing is not consequent upon the initial belief. Rather, it
leads to the belief.
In each case mentioned above, one could hold the same belief before
the doing occurs. In such cases, one would be following the third kind of
sequence. In the third possible sequence, the doing is induced by and follows
from the belief. The example of carrying out the duties of filial piety most
clearly follows this sequence.64 The filial son has the belief that he should
care for his elderly parents in the winter and summer and that he should serve
and support them. He then feels filial love towards his parents, and his feelings
induce in him an intention to act on his belief.
Sometimes, the carrying out of his intention may be hindered by factors
beyond his control. Perhaps the rivers have suddenly burst their banks, thus
effectively cutting off all transportation routes to his parents’ village. Wang
would probably say that in such a scenario, as long as he has the proper
intention and tries his hardest to carry it out, he would be in the right affective
state. So for this kind of knowledge-action relation, the affections are more
important than the doing itself. This sequence of action could be charted as
“thinking, feeling, intending, and doing.” The “doing” may in some cases
be unnecessary, however, because the “doing” can be divided into “having
the intention to do,” “attempting to do,” and “succeeding in doing.” These
distinctions are important since success is sometimes contingent on factors
extraneous to the deliberation. Wang would aver that what is most important
is the intention to act, not the “act” itself, which may sometimes be beyond
our power.
From this analysis of the different possible sequences of action, it is
reasonable to conclude that Wang conceived of the continuum of action as
fairly fluid, so that it does not really matter which sequence is followed
as long as knowledge and action are both involved.65 Wang perhaps would
have even accepted other sequences of “action” as leading effectively to real
knowledge.
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Hence, the doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action, which is
realized through the extension of liangzhi, is a continuum of thinking, feeling,
intending, and sometimes, doing. The perfectly functioning liangzhi should,
in theory, advance through the relevant continuum of “actions” spontane-
ously, effortlessly, and flawlessly. Real knowledge can be achieved only if
one has experienced the entire sequence of actions, in whatever order, that are
relevant to the belief. Knowledge is incomplete until the knower has achieved
the affective state from action in regard to the belief. This is the meaning
of Wang’s phrase, “Knowledge is the beginning of action, and action is the
completion of knowledge.”66
Real knowledge and real warrant
Thus, the notion of warrant that would make mere true belief into real knowl-
edge would have to go beyond Plantinga’s formula of proper function. A
fifth requirement is needed – that person S be in an affective state from
action appropriate to belief p. Since the requirement stipulates the subject
have a personal experience that produces personal affections, it rules out the
possibility of warrant transfer from such sources as testimony.67 Real knowl-
edge must thus come by way of personal experience and affective states. For
example, you could not have real knowledge that “filial piety demands that
we love our parents” from my testimony that it does so unless you experi-
ence the entire continuum of action relevant to that belief yourself. Warrant
cannot transfer to you through my testimony of my personal experience. You
must personally respond in the appropriate way with the proper affections.
Precisely how one is to determine whether an action is “appropriate” is a
question that Wang neglects to address in any detail. His reliance on examples
and avoidance of systematic explanations result in a degree of vagueness.
Ambiguity, however, also attends contemporary accounts of warrant.68
A parallel concept to real knowledge is real warrant, which is the feature
that turns true belief into real knowledge. The resulting formula, which is a
revised version of warrant as proper function, for real warrant derived from
the liangzhi is:
A belief p will have real warrant for a person S if and only if S is in an
affective state from action appropriate to belief p, and p is produced in
S by a properly functioning liangzhi in a cognitive-affective environment
that is appropriate for S’s liangzhi, according to a design successfully
aimed at truth, and the degree of warrant p enjoys for S is directly
proportional to the firmness with which S holds p.
A more general formula can be drawn from this that pertains to moral and
spiritual beliefs in general:
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A belief p will have real warrant for a person S if and only if S is in an
affective state appropriate to belief p, and p is produced in S by properly
functioning cognitive-affective faculties in an appropriate cognitive-
affective environment for S’s kind of cognitive-affective faculties, accord-
ing to a design successfully aimed at truth, and the degree of warrant p
enjoys for S is directly proportional to the firmness with which S holds p.
An example of how one could achieve real knowledge of a religious
belief is Wang’s belief that p, where p is “I am metaphysically one with the
universe.”69 Wang could claim to have real knowledge of his belief p if and
only if p is true, and p is generated by his properly functioning liangzhi, which
is designed to aim successfully at truth, in an environment appropriate to the
liangzhi, and he is highly confident in his belief.70 I have already discussed
how the beliefs produced by the liangzhi can meet the requirements of warrant
as proper function. A further condition is required for real knowledge of p,
however. Wang must be in an affective state from action appropriate to p.
In this case, that would mean that upon perceiving the relevant evidence, he
immediately feels his harmonious unity with the universe. Relevant evidence
could include things he has read, but it could also include the mere perception
of starving and dying people, or trampled flowers and wantonly broken tiles
and bricks.71 Wang testifies that he feels the suffering and bitterness of these
people and of these flowers, tiles, and bricks as personal injuries to his own
body. So he at least appears to have gone through the relevant continuum of
action. Wang is hence in a position to claim warrant for his belief that p, and
if p is true, he has real knowledge of p.
One could ask, however, what reasons there are to believe that we are
metaphysically one with the universe. Why should we believe Wang’s view
of ultimate reality? A proper answer to this question would require going
beyond the scope of this paper, for it would necessitate answering the de
facto question. And all along, I have claimed that Neo-Confucian belief is
probably warranted only if Neo-Confucian belief is true, and Plantinga has
claimed the same for Christian belief. The de jure objection is dependent on
the de facto objection. If Wang’s description of ultimate reality is true, then
Wang’s Neo-Confucian beliefs probably are warranted. If it is false, then they
are probably not warranted. In this paper, I have not attempted to determine
whether Wang’s Neo-Confucian beliefs are true. Nor has Plantinga, in his
work on warrant, attempted to determine whether any Christian beliefs are
true. The concept of warrant is concerned primarily with the issue of ration-
ality, and is only incidentally related to the issue of truth. Hence, assuming
that the truth of Wang’s Neo-Confucian beliefs are as yet undetermined, in
the sense that there is no conclusive “knock-down” argument for their truth
or falsehood, it is possible that Wang’s Neo-Confucian beliefs are warranted.
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Plantinga’s own theory of warrant as proper function seems to leave room
for affections to play a role. First, in the last clause of his formula he states
that “the degree of warrant p enjoys for S is directly proportional to the firm-
ness with which S holds p.” In explaining this firmness of belief, Plantinga
claims that “the more clearly I see a proposition to be true, the more firmly I
believe it,” at least in most cases.72 Plantinga describes the degree of firmness
that typically guarantees sufficient warrant for knowledge as “psychological
certainty” of the kind that is associated with self-evident truth and clear
memories.73 Any lesser degree of inclination to believe the proposition needs
to be addressed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the belief is
held firmly enough for knowledge. This kind of firmness naturally, especially
in the Christian context of his last book, reminds one of the role of faith
in Christian epistemology. In talking about faith, Plantinga describes it as
a confidence and assurance, a sure and certain belief, and a steady trust in,
for example, the proposition that God exists.74 He also argues that belief in
God’s existence can be a properly basic belief, which seems to the believer
phenomenologically similar to beliefs produced by perception, memory, and
a priori belief.75 So there seems to be an unexplored role for the affections
here.76 If one feels doubtful and uncertain about a belief, these feelings could
jeopardize the belief’s warrant. Feelings of confidence, assurance, doubt, and
uncertainty clearly differ, however, from Wang’s notion of selflessness and
the affective state from action. Still, the formula invites the question of the
role of affections in determining warrant.
Second, Plantinga addresses the issue of the role of affections in Christian
epistemology in his Warranted Christian Belief. He argues for the viability
of a kind of knowledge Jonathan Edwards, the eighteenth century American
theologian, called “spiritual knowledge” and he calls “experiential knowl-
edge”: “[A] person may know, in a way, that God is beautiful and lovely
(perhaps she takes this on the authority of someone else), but there is a kind of
knowledge of this loveliness she doesn’t have (experiential knowledge), and
it is precisely this kind of knowledge that is the spiritual knowledge of which
Edwards speaks.”77 This sounds remarkably similar to Wang’s notion of real
knowledge. Plantinga even uses the example of knowing the taste and sweet-
ness of honey. Wang goes further, however, by connecting his concept of real
knowledge with intentions and with actual action, such as in the example
of knowing the meaning of filial piety. In this sense, Wang’s version of this
higher kind of knowledge seems richer.
Unfortunately, Plantinga fails to incorporate his concept of experiential
knowledge into his broader notion of knowledge. He spends considerable
time discussing whether intellect or will is prior in the production of Christian
belief and insists on a bifurcation between the domains of cognition and
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affection: “Intellect is the province of belief; will, the province of affection.”78
He even presents an analogue of warrant for affections, in which the affec-
tions have appropriate objects in the same way that the intellect is ordered
to truth.79 He is careful, though, to keep cognition and affection separate,
and he seems blind to how the affections can play an integral role in the
establishment of cognitive warrant. Wang’s point in his doctrine of the unity
of knowledge and action is precisely that cognition and affection cannot be
separated. The possession of the right affective states is necessary for proper
cognitive function and for the attainment of real knowledge. For Wang, real
knowledge, or “experiential knowledge” in Plantinga’s terminology, is the
only kind of knowledge worth having, especially in the realms of ethics and
religion.
Conclusion
Wang’s theory of liangzhi can provide a way for Neo-Confucian beliefs
to meet the requirements of warrant as proper function. Beliefs produced
by the liangzhi can thus be warranted. Furthermore, if the Neo-Confucian
view of ultimate reality is true, the liangzhi-generated beliefs probably are
warranted. This poses a serious difficulty and constitutes a significant defeater
for Plantinga’s argument for the rationality of Christian belief. Moreover,
the theory of warrant as proper function conveys an incomplete account of
Neo-Confucian religious and moral knowledge and of religious and moral
knowledge in general. According to Wang, the liangzhi is both a cognitive
and an affective faculty, so for a theory of warrant to be universal, it must
encompass the affective dimension of knowledge. Wang’s doctrine of the
unity of knowledge and “action” thus reveals a lacuna in the theory of warrant
as proper function. A fifth condition is required – that a person S be in an
affective state from action appropriate to the belief p. I generalize this condi-
tion to cover moral and religious belief in general – that a person S be in an
affective state appropriate to the belief p.
For the most part, Christian analytic philosophers have paid relatively little
attention to the philosophical complexity and sophistication of non-Western
religions, such as Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. A tantalizing
topic beyond the scope of this paper is what insights some of these non-
Western religions can contribute to the perennial problems of Christian
philosophy. The strong points of one religion may be the weak points of
another, and mutual consideration can yield fruit for both perspectives.80 In
developing theories of religious knowledge in particular, philosophers of any
religion ought to take into account the epistemologies of the world’s other
major religions.
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In this paper, I have also tried to highlight the significant degree to which
cognition can depend on affection.81 If Wang is right in claiming that certain
affections are needed to have a special knowledge of religious and moral
truths, then this would help to explain the widespread lack of agreement
on religious and moral matters by intelligent, well informed, and honest
people. It is hard to believe the disagreement is due to a lack of intelligence,
obvious prejudice, unwillingness to consider objections, or simple philosoph-
ical obtuseness.82 Wang would probably ascribe it to a failure of the affections
– either one’s self-centered desires are clouding one’s cognitive and affective
faculties or one has not yet experienced the continuum of actions appropriate
to the belief. Even if one does not share Wang’s metaphysical views regarding
the nature of reality, one can still appreciate the strength and value of his
argument that proper affections are needed for proper cognition.83
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